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NO. 27 JUNE 2020 Introduction 
German and International 
Crisis Management in the Sahel 
Why Discussions about Sahel Policy Are Going around in Circles 
Denis M. Tull 
In May, Germany’s parliament approved the country’s continued military partici-
pation in two missions in Mali and the Sahel. As part of the UN Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) and the EU Training Mission EUTM Mali, 
up to 1,550 German soldiers can be deployed. Given the scale of these engagements, 
which are currently Germany’s largest, German discussions on Sahel policy, like those 
elsewhere, have been sluggish and unproductive. One reason for this is that buzz-
words and false certainties determine the debate, which is largely detached from 
strategic considerations. 
 
One of the unquestioned premises from 
which debate on the Sahel often proceeds is 
its analogy and comparability with Afghani-
stan. What would seem more productive, 
however, is to apply the lessons from the 
engagement in Afghanistan to the inter-
vention in the Sahel in order to be more 
effective. This requires a discussion that 
goes beyond the exchange of tropes and 
buzzwords. 
France: Partner or Leader? 
In Germany, no discussion on the Sahel is 
complete without reference to France. This 
is only to be expected, since France is not 
only Germany’s closest partner, but it can 
also claim European and international 
leadership on the Sahel. However, pointing 
to France becomes problematic when, on 
the German side, presumptions about 
French Sahel policy affect and constrain the 
shaping of its own policy toward the region. 
On the one hand, there are those in Ger-
many who want to cooperate with France 
in Mali for bilateral reasons, in support of 
European integration, or because they con-
sider the Sahel important. Generally speak-
ing, these voices have a tendency to readily 
accept French leadership in the Sahel or to 
recognize France as the framework nation. 
This is usually justified by France’s incom-
parably higher level of involvement and 
its supposedly superior knowledge of the 
region. Others regard cooperation with 
France as inevitable but see a need for Ber-
lin to distinguish itself somewhat from 
Paris. They cultivate a diffuse, persistent 
distrust of French policy toward Africa or 
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consider it to be dominated by the military, 
and therefore misguided. 
It is undeniable that European and inter-
national involvement in the Sahel is incon-
ceivable without a major French footprint. 
By implication, Berlin should take a critical 
look at French policy, but without perpetu-
ating those clichés and myths that sweep-
ingly portray French policy in the Sahel 
as driven by dubious and self-interested 
motives. At least the last two French mili-
tary interventions – in Mali and the Cen-
tral African Republic (both in 2013) – 
cannot be interpreted in this way. Paris 
intervened reluctantly in both cases, in Mali 
at the request of the government in Bamako 
and to the applause of the Malian popula-
tion and neighboring states. 
Where there is dissent, Germany should 
bring it forward, more strongly than before. 
This is all the easier because many other 
European countries are also involved in the 
Sahel today. There is no compelling reason 
to take for granted that France could or 
should define European and international 
engagement in the Sahel. France is cer-
tainly conscious and protective of its power 
and influence there. Politicians in France 
also have a tendency to consider Europe 
as a platform for French leadership. Never-
theless, the problem not only lies in Paris. 
European partners, as well as the United 
States, place high expectations on France 
as regards initiative and leadership. Thus, 
French dominance of Sahel policy becomes 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. Whether this is 
conducive to the success of international 
stabilization efforts is doubtful, given 
France’s increasingly precarious political 
legitimacy in the Sahel. As a result, it 
should not be in France’s, Germany’s, or 
Europe’s interest that Paris always be at 
the forefront, both in terms of policy and 
visibility. 
This, of course, presupposes that Germa-
ny and other European states not only 
reject French proposals, but that they them-
selves take the initiative by suggesting com-
mon positions and strategies. As seen from 
Paris, Berlin often slows down the French 
drive for action without proposing viable 
alternatives. Here, Paris and Berlin are 
going round in circles. 
A recurring disagreement concerns, for 
example, the use of force. If Germany and 
others decline to participate in the robust 
mentoring mission of the French-initiated 
Task Force Takuba, this is not only due to 
risk aversion, as many in Paris suspect. It is 
also because of the idea in Berlin that more 
military deployments, and more force, will 
not necessarily produce better results. In 
this regard, the German attitude is informed 
by 21 years of (ongoing) military deploy-
ments in Afghanistan. Here, differences in 
strategic culture and a lack of mutual com-
prehension become apparent and nurture 
frustrations on both sides. 
The Use of Force: Too Much, 
Too Little, or Counterproductive? 
A significant aspect in the discussion on 
stabilization strategies in Mali and the 
Sahel is the appropriate use of coercive 
means. One argument repeatedly put for-
ward by decision-makers, military officers, 
and commentators is that conflicts in the 
Sahel cannot be resolved exclusively by 
military means. But what does this mean? 
It is of little help to juxtapose the military 
with development cooperation, not to men-
tion that the latter struggles in zones of 
armed conflict. On the face of it, the omni-
present reference in German and EU dis-
course to “networked” or “integrated” 
approaches seems to be more suitable. But 
where and how the various dimensions of 
such an approach converge, and whether 
they are more than the sum of their parts, 
is not readily apparent. After all, such an 
approach has been pursued in Mali since 
2013, as German and EU officials are keen 
to stress, and at great expense. Whatever 
the reasons for this, the fact that security, 
political, and social trends in the region 
are overwhelmingly negative indicates that 
the approach has not yet been effective. 
A second common point in the German 
debate is the view that international policy 
toward the Sahel relies excessively on mili-
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tary means, which is said to be counter-
productive. There is some truth in the 
alleged primacy of the military. The use 
of force can be implemented in a more 
targeted manner and promises more im-
mediate effects than the pursuit of difficult 
and overriding goals such as resolving 
conflicts, rebuilding state institutions, and 
promoting development. Here, military 
action becomes a substitute for politics and 
policy. However, the idea that the primacy 
of the military applies without restriction 
must be put into perspective. 
To a certain degree, the impression 
of military primacy is created by the in-
ordinate amount of attention that Sahel 
observers and the media pay to Operation 
Barkhane, and to a lesser extent the Joint 
Force of the G5 countries. However, given 
the vast area of operations and the propor-
tion of soldiers actually engaged in combat 
operations (around 2,600 out of 5,100 for 
Barkhane), the alleged military footprint 
becomes lighter, even more so when con-
sidering the small sizes of the military 
forces in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. 
MINUSMA’s force, albeit with more than 
12,000 troops, is to a large extent involved 
in protecting the mission and enabling the 
work of its civilian components. Indeed, a 
long-standing Malian complaint has been 
that MINUSMA is not sufficiently robust. 
Finally, the limited response that France’s 
Takuba initiative has received from Euro-
pean partners is an indication that the 
primacy of the military is less straight-
forward than is often claimed. 
As divergent as both perspectives are, 
they are not conducive to a productive dis-
cussion on policy about the Sahel. At best, 
they help to shift responsibility: The idea 
that coercive means are insufficient on their 
own absolves the military because they can-
not solve the conflict. Moreover, the idea on 
the excessive weight of the military, for its 
part, relieves civilian actors of responsibil-
ity, because it leads to the conclusion that 
the primacy of the military leaves no room 
for civilian and political efforts. 
Instead, the focus of the debate should 
be re-directed toward the strategic goals 
that can be achieved by military means. 
Decision-makers must ask themselves how 
the tactical goals of counterterrorism are 
related to the strategic goal of stabilizing 
Mali under local authority. If counterterror-
ism is regarded as indispensable for Mali’s 
stabilization, then the objectives to be 
achieved must be specified, i.e., the point 
at which counterterrorism could be con-
sidered successful – or successful enough 
(and completed). It is doubtful whether 
benchmarks can be defined for this. How-
ever, if this is not possible, the opposite 
conclusion is that the military-led counter-
terrorism mission would have no end in 
sight. All of this suggests the necessity for 
a political and strategic debate about the 
significance of terrorism as an obstacle 
to the stabilization of Mali and the Sahel. 
Closely related, it seems indispensable to 
revive the debate about the conditions 
under which one may hope that Malian 
partners will be able to take responsibility 
for stabilization, and what foreign partners 
may need to do to help them obtain that 
goal. Among other things, this concerns 
the mandate of EUTM Mali. 
Also conceivable is a shift in emphasis 
toward a stronger focus on civilian security 
forces, the judiciary, and law enforcement 
agencies. They might be better suited for 
maintaining law and order than thinly 
spread and often static military forces, which 
also have a disturbing human rights record. 
A debate should be held on this in the EU. 
Of course, it promises to be controversial 
because France advocates the continuum of 
security and defense – a concept that other 
Europeans are deeply uncomfortable with. 
Governance: 
The Call for Better Government 
The governments of the states in the Sahel 
are the focus of much attention. Foreign 
partners are demanding more ownership, 
more commitment to reform, and more 
effective policy-making – in short, better 
governance. The governance concept is 
based on a functionalist understanding of 
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politics. It expresses the expectation that 
the governments in the Sahel should organ-
ize public goods such as security, infrastruc-
ture, and education. But this assumption 
all too often proves to be an empty formula 
that ignores local politics, i.e., the conflicts 
that shape the possibilities and modalities 
of government. 
Outsiders looking for explanations of 
“bad governance” usually revert to two pro-
positions: Local actors lack the political will 
to engage in appropriate governance, or 
they lack the requisite capacities to do so. 
The assertion that there is a lack of 
political will, which is often associated with 
corruption and clientelism, frequently leads 
to appeals that outsiders should increase 
pressure on local actors to change their 
behavior. In Mali, for example, a typical 
example concerns the outside pressure put 
on the government and northern rebels to 
implement the faltering peace accord that 
they signed in 2005. In exceptional cases, 
external support is tied to changes in the 
behavior of local actors (conditionalities). 
However, political elites in Mali and the 
Sahel are well-aware of European anxieties 
about migration and terrorism coming out 
of the region. They therefore tend to not 
take conditionalities very seriously. They 
know that they have leverage (and time) 
and make a virtue of their external depend-
ence, because crises and conflicts bring 
considerable material and financial aid into 
the country. The example of Mali – where 
the international community is trying in 
vain to push for the implementation of a 
peace agreement using a wide and growing 
range of instruments to exert pressure (in-
cluding UN sanctions) – is evidence of an 
asymmetry of power, and thus of the limits 
of external influence. 
External aid is often not attached to con-
ditionalities, because the problem of “bad 
governance” is blamed on the lack of local 
capacities. The capacity-building approach 
has spread to all sectors and areas (army 
reconstruction, combating corruption, the 
work of parliaments, development coopera-
tion, etc.). It is the ubiquitous response to 
the call for better governance. Often, how-
ever, these programs and projects do not 
lead to enhanced capacity, but rather to 
increased dependence. Frequently, this is 
compatible with – or in the interest of – 
local elites who delegate tasks that are 
assumed to be the responsibility of the state 
to outside actors. As a result, the goal of 
greater local responsibility and ownership 
moves even further away. 
Calls for better governance do not mean 
much. More important would be a dis-
cussion of strategies and instruments that 
may be able to address the problems and 
dilemmas outlined above. These include 
the apparent paradox that the situation in 
the Sahel is steadily deteriorating despite the 
fact that the international community has 
enlarged and deepened its footprint. It is 
fair to say that interveners have barely 
changed their course of action over the past 
couple of years, beyond minor adjustments. 
Their reasoning always seems to be that 
their involvement in the Sahel must be ex-
tended and intensified. The less the situa-
tion resembles their objectives, the more 
that needs to be done. In order to make 
progress on ideas of local ownership and 
responsibility, however, an alternative 
strategy should at least be conceivable. This 
does not necessarily mean an abrupt with-
drawal, but it does mean addressing the 
indirect and unintended consequences that 
external actors have on the strategies and 
behavior of local protagonists. Such factors 
should be given greater consideration in 
current discussions, because there is little 
to suggest today that the Sahel intervention 
will be a short one. 
Dr. Denis M. Tull, Senior Associate in the Middle East and Africa Division at SWP, is currently working as a 
researcher at the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM) in Paris. 
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